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Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde’s work has received extensive scholarly attention
beyond Germany in recent years, with incisive discussions of his legal and
constitutional theory, his theorization of the relation between politics, law and
religion, and his intellectual mentors. But amid Brexit and the run-up to the
European elections in May 2019, it is worthwhile returning to some of the finest
moments of Böckenförde the public intellectual. He penned his writings on the
process of European integration just after having retired in 1996 from both the
Federal Constitutional Court (after the usual twelve years judges may serve on the
constitutional bench in Germany) and also the University of Freiburg, where he had
served as professor of public law, constitutional and legal history and philosophy
of law since 1976.1) These are: Which Path is Europe Taking? (1997); The Future
of Political Autonomy: Democracy and Statehood in a Time of Globalization,
Europeanization, and Individualization (1998) [both included in Ernst-Wolfgang
Böckenförde: Constitutional and Political Theory. Selected Articles, edited and
annotated by Mirjam Künkler and Tine Stein. Oxford University Press, 2017];
Conditions of European Solidarity (2003); and “No” to the EU Accession of Turkey
(2004).
Böckenförde was a proponent of European integration, regarding it as desirable first
and foremost from a political point of view: as a peace process. But he formulated
four cardinal warnings about the way the process was being conducted. Re-reading
today his writings penned in the 1990s and early 2000s, Böckenförde’s warnings
appear almost prophetic. They chiefly concerned (1) the issue of democracy internal
to the EU, (2) the weakness of European cultural policy, (3) the tensions arising
from discrepancies between European economic and fiscal policies, and (4) the
issue of diverging views between EU member states as to the ultimate purposes of
integration.
(1) Böckenförde’s democratic theory is intimately tied to the concept of the “chain
of legitimacy”. In representative democracy, all political decisions ultimately need
to be traced back to the people, for these decisions to carry democratic legitimacy.
The “chain of legitimacy” may be long, but it must not be interrupted. However,
in the EU the chain of legitimacy does not flow from the European electorate to
the European parliament which then forms the government. Nor does the EU
feature direct elections for any of its top executive positions. Instead rules and
regulations are predominantly generated by the representatives of the governments
of the member states with only limited participation by the European parliament.
This created both a democracy deficit internal to the EU, Böckenförde wrote, and
precluded the formation of a sense of a European demos responsible for its own
destiny. By design instead, the architecture of the EU reinforces representation via
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the national governments and as a result the reification of national political cultures.
Böckenförde proposed instead the adoption of a more federal structure in order to
relate the different polity levels in the union, with the principle of subsidiarity broadly
guiding the distribution of competencies.
(2) Böckenförde warned that far too little was done to integrate the peoples of
Europe on a cultural level – not to replace national belonging, but to complement
it. He argued that Europe needed joint history textbook commissions to transcend
the nation-focused history curricula still in place in EU member states. He lamented
that European publics still consumed their news almost exclusively through national
media that necessarily tended to prioritize national over European themes. He
liked to invoke Jean Monnet, one of the architects of the EU, who famously said:
“If I were to do it all over again, I would start with culture.” Böckenförde repeatedly
criticized the fact that the process of integration was predominantly organized along
economic dimensions (which he felt were necessary), with too little consideration
given to cultural issues; namely, how to increase cohesion between the peoples of
the EU member states, and how to foster the level of identification with one another
that the economic union based on joint liabilities would require. Shared possibilities
for democratic participation were not sufficient, Böckenförde argued, to create a
common democratic culture and social cohesion between the peoples of the EU.
Without a European cultural policy, the “market-economic approach” that dominated
the process of integration “will not lead to greater unity, but to greater separation”.
Importantly, Böckenförde pointed out, strong commitments to a shared European
culture should not be feared for leading to the demise of national appreciations.
One was not forced to choose between being European and, say, German, or
Portuguese. People were capable of multiple and overlapping identities, being
both British and European, for example, at the same time. But a European sense
of belonging would not evolve simply from greater economic interdependence
and periodic elections (which, besides, were still sites of competition between
nation-based, not EU-based parties). A European sense of belonging would require
institutions designed to promote it.
(3) With the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the members of what was then the European
Economic Community decided on the deeper economic and fiscal integration, and
a sub-group on a common currency. The implications of the currency union were
too little explained to EU citizens with the result, Böckenförde wrote in 1997, that
once financial crises were to break out, European publics would be ill prepared
and therefore reluctant to put up the transfer payments such crises required.
Furthermore, while Böckenförde welcomed the creation of the single market, he
warned that the political integration was lagging behind the economic integration,
with potentially disastrous electoral consequences: while EU member states were
less and less capable of regulating their internal markets (as this competency had
shifted to the EU- level), they remained nevertheless responsible for labour market
policy and distributive social policy in the eyes of the national voter. A legitimacy
deficit would arise: the member states are still seen as responsible for the common
good of their citizens, but national governments are no longer sovereign to set up
restraints for the common market. The Euro crises and the political crises ensuing
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in their wake, especially in Greece, Portugal and Italy, confirmed Böckenförde’s
concerns.
(4) Finally, Böckenförde defended the idea of a “multi-goal Europe” at a time when
even uttering the possibility of a “multi-speed Europe” was highly unpopular among
pro-European publics. Some saw in the idea of a multi-speed Europe an insult to
the members who had just joined, others suspected in the phrase the hidden desire
among the economically stronger members to share only some privileges of EU
membership with new candidates, but not all; in other words, to “cherry pick”. But
Böckenförde’s reasoning was rather different. Those advocating an “ever-closer
union” (especially Germany and France at the time) would need to accept that
other member states might never wish to pursue the same goal, notably Britain.
Therefore, Böckenförde insisted, it did not help to simply aim at a “multi-speed
Europe”, but one also needed to acknowledge the reality of a “multi-goal Europe”.
The practical implications of this were that one would need to open different EU
treaty mechanisms to different audiences and drop the goal of an ever-closer union
for all member states. For example, he proposed that Turkey might eventually join
the Euro group and thus the currency union, but stay out of the political union of the
EU. Britain on the other hand should be allowed to opt out of those mechanisms
aiming at a closer political union, while remaining economically integrated. Had
Böckenförde’s engagement for a “multi-goal Europe” gained more currency earlier,
today’s Euro-sceptics might have less success in winning votes with arguments
against an ever-closer union.
Böckenförde’s vision of Europe was one deeply appreciative of the diversity of
the European peoples, rich in different cultural, societal, political and institutional
traditions, but united in the idea of building a shared area of freedom, security,
and justice based on a common understanding of human rights and a social
responsibility to regulate market economies. His vision reflected his overall
approach: to meet others at eye-level, and to let the better argument win, pragmatic
and non-ideological.
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